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I. INTRODUCTION
T is often remarked that the United States does not have an actual
health care "system," but rather a patchwork of financing and deliv-
ery systems more remarkable for their lack of real coordination than
anything else. Similarly, health law cannot help but resemble this non-
system for which it provides the infrastructure. With the passing of an-
other year, Texas has again expanded the practice of health law by adding
to the patchwork of new legal considerations that the health care industry
must track and manage. This article presents the key health law develop-
ments from the Survey period under four topic areas: physician and facil-
ity liability; contractual obligations; government investigations and
enforcement; and public health and indigent care.
II. PHYSICIAN AND FACILITY LIABILITY
With respect to the liability of health providers, there were four key
cases from the Texas Supreme Court and one from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The opinion in the federal case-
in which the appellate court reversed an infamous multimillion-dollar
verdict against a hospital and the physicians who temporarily restricted
another physician's privileges during a peer-review investigation-may
prove to have the greatest impact of the five cases discussed in this
section.
A. GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN HOSPITAL OUTSOURCING
In Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the Dallas Court of Appeals' holding that a hos-
pital was grossly negligent in the death of a man who was presented to
the hospital in the morning with difficultly breathing and died later that
night due to an acute mitral valve leakage.1 After initially arriving at the
hospital, the treating physician ordered a "stat" echocardiogram (echo)
for the patient.2 The mitral valve problem was identified as soon as the
1. 271 S.W.3d 238, 243-45 (Tex. 2008).
2. Id. at 244.
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echo was completed.3 However, it was not completed until almost three
hours after it was ordered, and the patient died shortly thereafter. 4 Un-
beknownst to the physician; the hospital, Columbia Medical Center of
Las Colinas, had outsourced its echo services and had elected by contract
not to pay an additional fee for guaranteed echo response times in emer-
gency situations. 5
Ultimately, the supreme court found that Columbia's conduct deviated
so far from the standard of care as to create an extreme risk of harm, and
that Columbia was subjectively aware of, but consciously indifferent to,
this risk because Columbia: "[(1)] had actual knowledge of the necessity
for emergency echo services . . . [(2)] declined to make such services
available, and [(3)] failed to communicate the limitation on its echo ser-
vices to its physicians or nursing staff."'6 Columbia argued that it could
not be held grossly negligent because echo services were not required
hospital services.7 The supreme court explained that this argument was
irrelevant because the hospital chose to provide such services. 8 The su-
preme court further explained that the physician could have referred the
patient to a facility with capability to provide the echo in a timely manner
if he had known that Columbia did not have such capabilities. 9 The ma-
jority opinion of the supreme court upheld the jury's findings of gross
negligence despite the dissenting opinion of Justices Green and Hecht,
who argued there was no evidence that Columbia recognized, at the time
it was negotiating the echo services contract, that the lack of a guaranteed
response time "would pose an extreme risk of harm to its patients." 10
As outsourcing contracts become more common, they inherently intro-
duce novel liability risks. The opinion in Hogue demonstrates the su-
preme court's concern over outsourcing arrangements for hospital
services through its insistence that the ultimate responsibility of patient
care at the hospital remains with the hospital, regardless of outsourcing.
B. PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE IN SUICIDE CASES
In Providence Health Center v. Dowell, a divided Texas Supreme Court
addressed the causation parameters of hospital and physician liability
when a patient commits suicide shortly after an emergency room visit for
an attempted suicide.11 The parents of the deceased patient, the Dowells,
brought a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, the
hospital's psychiatric treatment center, and the emergency room physi-
3. Id. at 245.
4. Id. at 244-45.
5. Id. at 249-50.
6. Id. at 250, 253.
7. Id. at 249.
8. Id. at 253.
9. Id. at 251.
10. Id. at 257, 259 (Green, J., dissenting).
11. 262 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. 2008).
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cian who saw the patient. 12 The Dowells argued that the physician's brief
interaction with the patient fell below the standard of care because the
physician did not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the patient's
suicide risk before allowing the patient to be released from the hospital.' 3
The Waco Court of Appeals agreed with the Dowells and affirmed the
jury's finding that the hospital and the psychiatric center were both liable
for forty percent of the damages, and that the physician was liable for the
remaining twenty percent. 14
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision and dis-
agreed with the Dowells' argument that the health care providers' incom-
plete suicide assessment and failure to hospitalize the patient were the
proximate cause of the patient's subsequent death. 15 The supreme court
explained that even if the health care providers were negligent, "their
negligence was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of [the pa-
tient's] death a day and a half later" because "the defendants' negligence
was too attenuated from the suicide to have been a substantial factor in
bringing it about."'16 The supreme court listed the following facts in sup-
port of its conclusion: (1) the patient likely would not have consented to
hospitalization even if a more thorough assessment had been performed,
(2) there was no evidence that the patient could have been involuntarily
hospitalized, (3) there was no evidence that hospitalization would have
prevented the suicide, and (4) the time and intervening events between
the release and the suicide were too remote. 17 As described by the su-
preme court, "[the patient's] inability to cope with personal crises led to
his death,"' 8 not the health care providers' negligence.
Justice Wainwright concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed
with the majority's decision to reverse the appellate court's judgment but
preferred remanding the case for a new trial because the jury did not
address the question of the patient's proportionate liability.' 9 The dis-
senting opinion, written by Justice O'Neil, and joined by Justices Jeffer-
son and Medina, expressed concern over the majority's creation of "new
legal hurdles that are insurmountable" and the implication that "suicide
is simply not preventable. '20 The majority rebutted these assertions by
stating, "[tihe dissent seems to imply that a health care provider who is
negligent in treating a patient's mental health is liable regardless of
whether the negligence caused a subsequent suicide, thereby becoming in
effect an insurer of the patient's conduct, whatever it might be."'21
12. Id. at 327.
13. Id. at 328.
14. Id. at 327-28.
15. Id. at 325.
16. Id. at 328, 330.
17. Id. at 328-30.
18. Id. at 329.
19. Id. at 330-32 (Wainright, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 333, 336 (Oneill, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 330.
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In essence, the opinion in Providence requires plaintiffs in suicide cases
to prove that the health care provider's failure to perform an act required
by the standard of care was a substantial factor in causing the subsequent
suicide. In assessing substantiality, Texas courts ask whether the suicide
would still have occurred even if the health care provider had performed
the expected act. If the answer is "likely not," then the plaintiff will have
successfully proven the causation element, but if the answer is "likely
yes," then the plaintiff's claim will fail.
C. INADEQUATE EXPERT REPORTS
In Lewis v. Funderburk22 and Leland v. Brandal,23 the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed statutory procedure issues related to inadequate expert
reports in medical malpractice cases governed by section 74.351 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.24 In Funderburk, the supreme
court resolved a split among the appellate courts regarding appellate ju-
risdiction over interlocutory appeals of expert reports governed by the
statute.25 The dispute in Funderburk arose when the defendant, Dr.
Lewis, allegedly provided negligent treatment of a child's broken wrist.26
The supreme court was asked to review the Waco Court of Appeals' re-
fusal, for want of jurisdiction, of Dr. Lewis' interlocutory appeal of a de-
nied motion to dismiss due to an inadequate expert report.27 At the time
of the decision, the majority of Texas appellate courts had held that they
had jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of this nature because the stat-
utory provision allowing interlocutory appeals when the plaintiff does not
file an expert report implicitly also applies to situations in which the
plaintiff files an allegedly inadequate expert report. 28
The supreme court agreed with the majority of the appeals courts and
reversed the Waco Court of Appeals. 29 The supreme court explained that
the Texas Legislature intended the interlocutory appeal option to apply
to inadequate reports, though not explicitly stated in section 74.351, be-
cause another provision in the statute, section 74.351(c), specifies that a
plaintiff will be held to have not filed an expert report under the statute if
the plaintiff files a report that is later determined to be inadequate. 30
Thus, the supreme court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
consider the interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of Dr. Lewis'
motion to dismiss.31
22. 253 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2008).
23. 257 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2008).
24. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
25. Funderburk, 253 S.W.3d at 205-06.
26. Id. at 206.
27. Id. at 206-07.
28. Id. at 205-06.
29. Id. at 208.
30. Id. at 207.
31. Id. at 208.
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In another dispute over an inadequate expert report, the supreme court
in Leland interpreted a provision of the medical malpractice statute that
addresses court discretion in granting extensions to cure inadequate re-
ports.32 The dispute arose when the defendant, Dr. Leland, allegedly
caused the plaintiff's stroke, resulting in paralysis and inability to speak,
by ordering the patient to stop taking his anticoagulant medication prior
to a dental procedure.33 When the plaintiff filed suit, Dr. Leland argued
that the plaintiff's expert report was inadequate under the statute.34 The
trial court disagreed, and Dr. Leland filed an interlocutory appeal of the
decision to the San Antonio Court of Appeals.35 The court of appeals
agreed with Dr. Leland, but gave the trial court the discretion to allow
the plaintiff a thirty-day window to correct the inadequate expert re-
port.36 Dr. Leland then appealed to the supreme court, arguing that the
thirty-day extension at section 74.351(c) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code only applies to trial court determinations of report inade-
quacy, not appellate-level determinations. 37 The statutory provision in
question permits "the court" to allow the thirty-day extension, but the
provision does not specify the courts to which it refers.38 The supreme
court agreed with the appellate court's holding that the statute applies to
both trial court and appellate court determinations that an expert's report
is inadequate because the legislature did not insert language into the stat-
ute that would limit "the court[s]" to which the thirty-day-extension pro-
vision applied. 39
The dissent in Leland argued that the legislature did not intend the
thirty-day extension to apply at the appellate level, because it would re-
sult in protracted litigation that the legislature had intended to curb with
the statutory expert-report requirements. 40 However, the majority con-
cluded that holding otherwise would foreclose the plaintiff's opportunity
to cure expert-report deficiencies, which the legislature clearly intended
to allow at section 74.351(c) of the statute. 41 Thus, the supreme court
upheld the appellate court's decision that the trial court could allow the
plaintiff a thirty-day window to correct the report's inadequacies under
section 74.351(c) of the statute.42
D. PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY IN STATE DEFAMATION ACTION
In Poliner v. Texas Health Systems, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed an infamous $33.5 million defamation judg-
32. Leland, 257 S.W.3d 204.




37. Id. at 207.
38. Id.; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(c).
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 210.




ment against a hospital and the physicians who temporarily restricted Dr.
Poliner's privileges during a peer review investigation.43 Though rejected
by the district court, the Fifth Circuit allowed the federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act's (HCQIA)44 peer review immunity defense to
bar monetary damages for a defamation claim.45 Dr. Poliner argued that
the review actions did not qualify for HCQIA immunity because the re-
viewers were maliciously motivated and driven by financial reasons
rather than by concern for quality patient care. 46 The appellate court
rejected this argument because it found that the reviewers had ample,
objective reasons for the privilege restriction and, thus, the court could
not look to subjective reasons under the HCQIA immunity standard. 47
The court explained that physicians have access to injunctive and declara-
tory relief, but not monetary relief, if subjected to malicious peer review
actions, and that Congress intended this result because the "system-wide
benefit of robust peer review" outweighs the burdens of these "occa-
sional harsh results."4 8
The court also rejected Dr. Poliner's argument that the reviewers could
not avail themselves of the immunity defense because they had not com-
plied with the peer review provisions of the hospital's medical staff by-
laws, which required evidence of a "present danger" to patients before
suspending privileges. 49 The court explained that HCQIA does not re-
quire compliance with hospital bylaws to be eligible for the peer review
immunity.50 In all, the court held that Dr. Poliner failed to rebut the
statutory presumption that the defendants were entitled to HCQIA peer
review immunity.5 1
Dr. Poliner submitted a petition to the United States Supreme Court to
review the Fifth Circuit's decision, but the petition was denied on January
21, 2009.52 Hospitals and peer reviewers are now able to breathe a sigh of
relief in Texas, although the tradeoff is that the Poliner opinion leaves
physicians who are subjected to egregious or ill-motivated peer reviews
with injunctive relief as their only available legal remedy, unless the hos-
pital's actions lacked any reasonable and objective basis.
III. CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
In the contract enforcement arena, two courts of appeals provided
opinions that should catch the attention of health care lawyers across the
43. 537 F.3d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009). As unusual
as a $33.5 million judgment is in a peer-review case, that amount was much less than the
jury's award of more than $360 million. Id. at 375.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152. (2000).
45. Poliner, 537 F.3d at 369-70.
46. Id. at 375.
47. Id. at 379-80.
48. Id. at 381.
49. Id. at 380-81.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 385.
52. Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009).
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state. In one, the court upheld a jury's damages award to a hospital for a
physician's breach of a recruiting agreement, despite the physician's de-
fense that the hospital also breached the agreement. In the second case,
the court upheld a patient-recruiting contract with a novel interpretation
of the advertising exception to the Texas Patient Solicitation law.
A. No EXCUSED PERFORMANCE UNDER RECRUITING AGREEMENT
In Hovorka v. Community Health Systems, Inc., the El Paso Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling that a surgeon, Dr. Hovorka,
owed a hospital, Big Bend Regional Medial Center (BBRMC), almost
$200,000 in damages, interest, and attorney's fees for violating the terms
of a recruiting agreement. 53
BBRMC claimed that Dr. Hovorka breached the recruiting agreement
by resigning from BBRMC and moving to another city prior to the end of
the three-year term of the agreement.5 4 In response to BBRMC's breach
of contract claim, Dr. Hovorka asserted the affirmative defense of ex-
cused performance for prior material breach. 55 Dr. Hovorka also
brought his own breach of contract and fraud claims against BBRMC.56
In support of his claims and affirmative defense, Dr. Hovorka specifically
alleged that BBRMC promised, but failed to do the following: (1) main-
tain accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations (JCAHO), (2) maintain Medicare and Medicaid
certifications, (3) provide two million dollars worth of hospital operating
equipment, (4) provide a medical office for Dr. Hovorka, and (5) provide
locum tenens coverage for Dr. Hovorka while he prepared and tested for
board certification.57
The recruiting agreement explicitly stated that BBRMC would be
JCAHO accredited and Medicare and Medicaid certified, as well as pro-
vide locum tenens coverage but it did not include any promises of operat-
ing equipment or a medical office. 58 Dr. Hovorka alleged that these
promises were made to him orally around the time of the contract negoti-
ations, but the appeals court held that Dr. Hovorka did not present suffi-
cient evidence to create a material issue of fact on these alleged promises
to support a breach of contract claim, fraud claim, or affirmative de-
fense.5 9 On the accreditation and certification issue, BBRMC argued
that those statements in the contract were not material terms because
they were mere "recitals" explaining the nature and context of the agree-
ment.60 The court of appeals rejected this argument, but still upheld the
53. 262 S.W.3d 503, 507-08 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 509.
56. Id. at 507.
57. Id. at 509-10.
58. Id.




lower court's summary judgment in favor of BBRMC on this issue.6 1 The
court explained that Dr. Hovorka's breach of contract claim and prior
material breach affirmative defenses both failed because Dr. Hovorka did
not present any evidence, other than conclusory statements, of the dam-
ages he suffered as a result of BBRMC's breach of these terms of the
agreement. 62 Dr. Hovorka's damages evidence was limited to his unsub-
stantiated statements that he lost around $104,000 a month because peo-
ple did not want to go to a hospital that was not certified or accredited.63
On the fraud claim, the appeals court chose not to disturb the jury's
findings that Dr. Hovorka ratified the alleged misrepresentations about
certification and accreditation when he chose to continue performing
under the agreement after learning that BBRMC was not certified or ac-
credited. 64 The court was not persuaded by Dr. Hovorka's argument that
the jury should have received an additional instruction that ratification
could not have occurred if Dr. Hovorka tried to stop the fraud, as such an
instruction was not supported under the law.65 Thus, the court ultimately
held BBRMC not liable for fraud or breach of contract and Dr. Hovorka
fully liable for breach of contract because: (1) Dr. Hovorka ratified the
agreement after learning of the alleged fraud and (2) Dr. Hovorka could
not prove the damages element of his breach of contract claim and prior
material breach defense. 66 The court affirmed the lower court's damages
award for contract breach and required Dr. Hovorka to return all monies
to BBRMC that he received while he was working for BBRMC in com-
pliance with the recruiting agreement, in addition to paying interest and
attorney's fees. 67
While the Hovorka opinion appears to allow hospitals wide latitude in
negotiations and performance of recruiting agreements with physicians in
Texas, the court used a novel analytical framework to support its holding
regarding Dr. Hovorka's affirmative defense of excused performance for
prior material breach. The court analyzed Dr. Hovorka's breach of con-
tract claim together with his prior material breach defense and treated
both as having the same elements of proof-including proof that Dr.
Hovorka suffered damages as a result of BBRMC's alleged breach.6 8
Surely, Dr. Hovorka was required to prove damages to succeed on his
breach of contract claim to obtain damages from BBRMC, but it is un-
clear why the court required Dr. Hovorka to prove damages to support
his prior material breach defense for excused performance on BBRMC's
breach of contract claim. In Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co.,
the most recent Texas Supreme Court opinion to discuss prior material
61. Id.
62. Id. at 511-12.
63. Id. at 511.
64. Id. at 513-14.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 511-14.
67. Id. at 507-08.
68. Id. at 508-09.
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breach as an affirmative defense, the court did not require proof of result-
ing damages to excuse performance. 69 Rather, the supreme court re-
quired the pleading party to prove that the other party had breached the
agreement and that the breach was material. 70 In Hovorka, the El Paso
Court of Appeals did not apply a similar independent analysis of Dr.
Hovorka's prior material breach defense. 71 Further, the court in
Hovorka rejected BBRMC's argument that the accreditation and certifi-
cation provisions of the contract were immaterial terms.72 Thus, it would
appear that Dr. Hovorka proved his prior material breach defense under
the analytical framework provided by the supreme court in Mustang
Pipeline when Dr. Hovorka presented evidence of the express terms of
the contract requiring BBRMC to maintain the JCAHO accreditation
and Medicare and Medicaid certifications.
The Hovorka opinion supports the argument that a breaching physician
must return all monies received under a recruiting agreement, despite
breaches by the hospital, if the physician cannot prove any damages re-
sulting from the hospital's breach. However, the supreme court opinion
in Mustang Pipeline ought to support an argument that, regardless of the
physician's ability to prove any resulting damages, the physician should
not be liable for all payments received under the agreement if the physi-
cian has proven a material breach by the hospital as a defense to contract
enforcement.
B. CONTRACT NOT ILLEGAL UNDER PATIENT SOLICITATION LAW
The Dallas Court of Appeals' decision in Piano Surgery Center v. New
You Weight Management Center is the first to interpret the current ver-
sion of the Texas Patient Solicitation Law.73 Originally enacted in 1991,74
the Patient Solicitation Law is modeled after the federal anti-kickback
statute, 75 which prohibits the payment or acceptance of remuneration in
return for the referral of medical services or products reimbursable under
69. 134 S.W.3d 195, 198-99 (Tex. 2004).
70. Id.
71. See Hovorka, 262 S.W.3d at 508-12.
72. See id. at 510.
73. 265 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.
§§ 102.001-.011 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (current version of the Texas Patient Solicitation
Law). In New Boston Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 47 S.W.3d 34, 38-39
(Tex. App.-.Texarkana 2001, no pet.), the court of appeals held a contract enforceable
under a prior version of the Patient Solicitation Law that excepted advertising arrange-
ments if payments were "not based on the volume or value of referrals" generated by the
advertising.
74. The Patient Solicitation Law was originally codified in the Health and Safety Code
at sections 161.091 through 161.094 under the "Illegal Remuneration" subchapter but was
re-codified in the Texas Occupations Code at sections 102.001 through 102.011 under the
"Solicitation of Patients" chapter in 1999. Compare Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S. (1991),
with Tex. H.B. 3155, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), and TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.011.




Medicare or Medicaid. 76 The Texas Patient Solicitation Law is broader
than its federal counterpart in that the former prohibits illegal remunera-
tion to or from any Texas-licensed health practitioner, regardless of
whether the practitioner requests Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement
for the services. 77 Thus, while profit-based incentive payments for
recruiting new clients are common in most industries, the United States
Congress and the Texas Legislature have prohibited this practice in the
health care industry through these laws.78
The dispute in Plano Surgery Center arose between a laparoscopic gas-
tric banding (lap-band) surgical services advertising and management
company, New You Weight Management Center (New You), and an am-
bulatory surgical center, Plano Surgery Center (PSC).79 PSC allegedly
breached an agreement with New You in which New You provided "mar-
keting services" for lap-band procedures performed at PSC, and, in re-
turn, PSC paid New You 66.66% of the profits realized by PSC for each
patient New You referred to PSC for the procedure. 80 The "marketing
services" New You provided were: (1) running radio, Internet, and print
advertisements to recruit prospective patients for the procedure; (2)
recruiting and training surgeons to perform the procedure; (3) conducting
informational seminars for prospective patients; (4) collecting medical
and financial information from prospective patients who expressed inter-
est in the procedure; (5) forwarding the prospective patient's information
to a surgeon selected by New You; (6) counseling the patient before and
after the procedure; and (7) counseling for the family during the
procedure. 81
Prior to the termination of the original agreement, attorneys for PSC
and New You met to discuss the legality of the arrangement, but no new
agreement was memorialized in writing.82 PSC's attorneys later proposed
that, going forward, PSC would pay New You a flat fee for its services
rather than the 66.66% profit fee. 83 However, shortly thereafter, PSC's
director told New You's director that there would be no change in their
payment arrangement. 84 Subsequently, when PSC did not pay the
66.66% profit fee, New You sued PSC for breach of contract and various
76. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (the federal anti-kickback statute), with TEX.
Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-102.011 (the Texas Patient Solicitation Law); see also TEX.
Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (specifying that interpretation of the Patient Solicitation Law
should be consistent with the federal anti-kickback statute and the implementing regula-
tions); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-0138 (1992); Letter Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 93-84(1993) (interpreting the Texas Patient Solicitation Law in light of the federal anti-kickback
statute and the implementing regulations).
77. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), with TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.001(a).
78. See New Boston, 47 S.W.3d at 38-39; Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-0138; Letter Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 93-84.
79. Piano Surgery Ctr. v. New You Weight Mgmt. Ctr., 265 S.W.3d 496, 498-99 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
80. 1d. at 499-500.
81. Id.





other equitable claims. 85 PSC argued that the contract was unenforce-
able because it was illegal under the Patient Solicitation Law and violated
public policy.86
The Dallas Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the lower court's hold-
ing in favor of New You and rejected PSC's argument that the contract
was unenforceable under the law.87 The court concluded that the con-
tract could have been legally performed as an "advertising" contract be-
cause, as the court interpreted the law, payments for advertising services
are generally excepted under the advertising provision at section 102.004
of the law, so long as the advertising was not deceptive or misleading. 88
Based on this presumption, the court then concluded that New You and
PSC presented conflicting material evidence during the trial.89 Specifi-
cally, PSC presented evidence that New You received prohibited remu-
neration for soliciting patients under the law, and New You presented
evidence that its services constituted permissible advertising under the
law.90 The court explained that if the evidence at trial does not conclu-
sively establish a defense, then the defending party must request that the
jury receive an instruction on the defense to avoid waiver on appeal.91
The court held that PSC had waived the illegal contract defense by not
requesting a defense instruction as required, based on the court's conclu-
sion that New You's services could be excepted from the law as permissi-
ble advertising. 92
The court's analysis neglected to address four key weaknesses in the
presumption that New You's services could be excepted from the law
under the advertising provision at section 102.004. First, it is difficult to
understand how the advertising provision alone could exempt New You's
services and payment arrangement when many of New You's services ap-
pear not to be related to advertising at all, such as: (1) training surgeons
to perform the procedure, (2) counseling the patient before and after the
procedure, and (3) counseling the family during the procedure. 93 It was
undisputed that New You provided these services to the patients and re-
ceived per-patient profit fees from PSC in return for providing these ser-
vices.94 However, the court neglected to discuss how these non-
advertising services were permissible under the advertising provision or
any other provision of the law.95
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 502.




92. Id.; TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.004 (Vernon Supp. 2008) ("Section 102.001 does
not prohibit advertising, unless the advertising is: (1) false, misleading, or deceptive; or (2)
not readily subject to verification, if the advertising claims professional superiority or the
performance of a professional service in a superior manner.").
93. See Piano Surgery Ctr., 265 S.W.3d at 499-500.
94. See id. at 500.
95. See id. at 502.
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Second, it is arguable that the court misinterpreted the advertising pro-
vision by reading it to be a comprehensive exception for any patient solic-
itation activity related to advertising so long as the advertising was not
deceptive or misleading. 96 Though the advertising provision could be in-
dependently read to have this meaning, it is unlikely that this meaning
was intended by the legislature when the provision is read in the context
of the statute as a whole. Such an interpretation of the advertising provi-
sion would essentially defeat the purpose of the law, because it would
permit health care providers to pay for otherwise improper patient solici-
tation services, so long as the services were accomplished in conjunction
with advertising. For example, according to the court's interpretation of
the advertising provision, the law would prohibit a dermatologist from
paying a nursing home employee for each nursing home resident he could
convince to visit the physician for a mole biopsy, but the law would allow
the same arrangement under the advertising provision if the employee
posted advertising flyers around the nursing home to recruit the residents
for the biopsy. Thus, this advertising "exception," as interpreted by the
court in Piano Surgery Center, would essentially swallow the law.
Further, reading the advertising provision as a comprehensive advertis-
ing exception is inconsistent with section 102.007 of the law, which ex-
cepts a specific type of suspect advertising arrangement-health care
provider advertising through information call centers-from the law. 97
This type of advertising arrangement is expressly exempted from the law
if the arrangement complies with numerous limitations to reduce the risk
of improper patient solicitation. 98 Such an exception would not be neces-
sary if section 102.004, as interpreted by the court in Piano Surgery
Center, created a comprehensive exception for any advertising-related ac-
tivities that were not deceptive or misleading.
Finally, the court's broad interpretation of the advertising provision is
inconsistent with the legislative history of the law, as well as the statute,
regulations, and cases interpreting the parallel federal anti-kickback stat-
ute on which the law was modeled. The federal anti-kickback regulations
create a safe harbor applicable to advertising contracts, which requires
that the aggregate compensation paid to an advertiser be set in advance
and not be determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or
value of any referrals or business generated by the advertising. 99 The
Ncw You compensation arrangement would not fit within this federal ex-
ception, because the 66.66% profit payment was not set in advance and
was directly related to the value of the business that New You's "advertis-
ing" activities generated for PSC.100 Furthermore, Nursing Home Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Services Inc. is a federal case with facts
96. See id. at 501-02.
97. Compare TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 102.004 with TEX. OcC. CODE ANN. § 102.007.
98. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.007.
99. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5) (2006). This safe harbor is not limited to advertising
contracts and applies more generally to any personal services or management contracts.
100. See Piano Surgery Ctr., 265 S.W.3d at 500.
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almost identical to those in Piano Surgery Center in which the court re-
fused to enforce a contract between a medical equipment provider and a
marketing company because the contract was illegal and against public
policy under the federal anti-kickback statute. 10 1 The court in Nursing
Home Consultants, held that the health care marketing contract was un-
enforceable because it based contract payments on the value of Medicare
business generated by the marketing. 10 2 The key difference between
Piano Surgery Center and Nursing Home Consultants is that the Texas
version of the advertising provision does not include the language of the
federal exception, which expressly prohibits payments based on the value
of referrals generated by the advertising activities. 10 3 Clearly, if the Texas
advertising provision included this language, it is unlikely that the court
in Plano Surgery Center could have held the contract enforceable based
on a plain reading of the law and New You's 66.66% profit fee.
The original 1991 version of the Texas advertising provision included
the exact language of its federal counterpart regarding prohibited pay-
ments based on the value of referrals. 10 4 But in 1993, the Texas Legisla-
ture amended the law for the stated purpose of strengthening and
broadening the scope of the law, and, incidentally, the language prohibit-
ing payments that take into account the volume or value of referrals was
deleted from the general advertising provision and moved to the nar-
rower advertising exception for health care information call centers. 10 5
The legislative history describes this change to the general advertising
provision as a "nonsubstantive" change. 106
101. 926 F. Supp. 835, 842-44 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
102. Id.
103. Compare TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 102.004, with 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5).
104. Compare Tex. H.B. 7, 72nd Leg., 1st C.S. (1991) (original codification of the adver-
tising exception stating "[t]his section shall not be construed to prohibit remuneration for
advertising, marketing, or other services that are provided for the purpose of securing or
soliciting patients provided the remuneration is set in advance, is consistent with the fair
market value of the services, and is not based on the volume or value of any patient
referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties."), with 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952(d)(5) (federal Anti-Kickback safe harbor for personal services contracts requir-
ing that "[t]he aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is
set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-length transactions and is not
determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
business otherwise generated between the parties.").
105. See Tex. S.B. 211, 73rd Leg., R.S. (1993); Senate Comm. on Health & Human
Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 211, 73rd Leg., R.S., at 1 (1993) ("At the time the current
remuneration law was adopted, allegations involving payment for patient referrals cen-
tered on various health-related professions. Since then, a steady stream of new allegations
have arisen involving individuals who are not regulated by state health care agencies and,
as a result, are not subject to the provisions of current law. The allegations have included
probation officers, ministers, school counselors, and private businesses set up to recruit
patients and employee assistance programs .... As enrolled, S.B. 211 expands the author-
ity of the illegal remuneration law and provides penalties for violations of this Act.").
106. Senate Comm. on Health & Human Servs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 210, 73rd Leg.,
R.S., at 9 (1993) ("Redesignates existing Subsection (f), deletes existing Subsections (d)
and (e). Makes nonsubstantive changes."). Both S.B. 210 and S.B. 211 were enacted dur-




The court in Plano Surgery Center did not discuss this legislative his-
tory, but it is unlikely that the legislature intended that this "nonsubstan-
tive" change to the general advertising provision, as part of a set of
amendments aimed at strengthening the law would have the opposite ef-
fect of allowing an advertising company to solicit patients for a medical
procedure in return for payments based on the value of the medical busi-
ness generated by the advertising.
Texas health law practitioners structuring advertising and marketing
contracts for health care services reimbursed by private health insurance
companies are now faced with more questions than answers about the
scope of the Texas Patient Solicitation Law in light of the Plano Surgery
Center opinion, which was based on statutory language that resulted from
amendments aimed at strengthening and broadening the scope of the law.
IV. GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
A. DISCOVERY PROTECTIONS WHEN COOPERATING
WITH THE GOVERNMENT
In In re Memorial Hermann Healthcare System, the Houston Four-
teenth Court of Appeals rejected an expansive interpretation of the privi-
lege protections outlined in the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act's
civil investigative demand (CID) provisions. 10 7 Memorial Hermann
Healthcare System sought to use the statutory CID privilege protec-
tions 10 8 to resist production of documents requested by a private antitrust
plaintiff, Stealth, L.P.10 9 Memorial Hermann asserted that the requested
documents were protected from disclosure in the private antitrust suit be-
cause it had previously produced the documents to the Texas attorney
general pursuant to a CID for possible antitrust violations.1 10 Specifi-
cally, Memorial Hermann argued that the statutory privilege was "a
'blanket privilege' under which a defendant may decline to turn over CID
materials unless its opponent can demonstrate 'good cause' for such pro-
duction." '1 11 Memorial Hermann explained that "the Legislature in-
tended to create a statutory privilege in businesses' favor to encourage
candid cooperation with a CID. 'q12
The court rejected Memorial Hermann's argument based on a plain
reading of the statute. 1 3 The court held that the statutory privilege "pre-
cludes the attorney general-but nobody else-from disclosing CID
materials"' 14 and that it "does not extend to CID materials held by the
defendant in private antitrust litigation."'1 5 The court rejected Memorial
107. 274 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.10(i) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
109. Memorial, 274 S.W.3d at 197.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 197-98.
112. Id. at 200.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 199.
115. Id. at 197.
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Hermann's argument that the purpose of the privilege was to encourage
candid cooperation during a government investigation because: (1) such
cooperation is required by law, and (2) deliberate withholding of infor-
mation requested under a CID is a criminal violation.116
While the court's opinion is straightforward and well-reasoned, it ne-
glects to address a key dimension of government investigations and pros-
ecutions. Corporations are encouraged to cooperate with the
government's investigation beyond what is required by law in return for
leniency from the government.11 7 By effectively granting private litigants
access to those documents released to the government in the spirit of
cooperation, the court's holding puts defendants in a tenuous position of
balancing the benefits of government leniency with the risks of civil litiga-
tion damages. Thus, an unintended consequence of the holding in Memo-
rial Hermann could be a reduction in voluntary cooperation by health
care providers and an increase in government investigation and prosecu-
tion costs.
B. PENALTIES AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR
MEDICAL RECORDS DISPOSAL
In almost identical cases, Texas v. CVS 118 and Texas v. Select Medical
Corp.,119 Texas Attorney General Gregg Abbott succeeded in enforcing
Texas' recently enacted identity theft protection laws120 against two
health care companies, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. and Select Medical Corpora-
tion, for discarding sensitive patient medical records and financial infor-
mation in dumpsters.121 In both petitions against the health care
companies, Abbott alleged that the companies violated the laws when
they: (1) failed to safeguard personal identifying information by not
shredding, erasing, or otherwise making the information unreadable or
undecipherable before disposal, (2) failed to implement and maintain
116. Id. at 200.
117. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division's Leniency
Program and Model Leniency Letters (November 19, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/pub-
lic/criminal/239583.htm ("Through the Division's leniency program, a corporation can
avoid criminal conviction and fines, and individuals can avoid criminal conviction, prison
terms, and fines, by being the first to confess participation in a criminal antitrust violation,
fully cooperating with the Division, and meeting other specified conditions.").
118. 2008 WL 1894881 253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex., Mar. 25, 2008).
119. No. CV-72881, Plaintiff's Original Petition, Texas v. Select Medical Corp. et al.,
No. 08-01-21154 (Hockley Co. Dist. Ct., July 16, 2008) (copy on file with SMU Law
Review).
120. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.48, 48.102, 48.201 (Vernon Supp. 2008) (en-
acted under Tex. H.B. 698, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) and Tex. S.B. 122, 79th Leg., R.S., at § 2
(2005)). It is important to note these statutes have been repealed and recodified at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 72.004, 521.052, 521.151 effective April 1, 2009, respectively.
Tex. H.B. 2278, 80th Leg., R.S., at 71-74, 267-68, 273-74 (2007).
121. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 3, Texas v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV-72881
(253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex. Apr. 16, 2007); Agreed Final Judgment at 1, Texas v.
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CV-72881 (253rd Dist. Ct., Liberty County, Tex. Mar. 25, 2008);
Plaintiff's Original Petition at 5-6, Texas v. Select Medical Corp., No. 08-01-21154 (286th
Dist. Ct., Hockley County, Tex. Jan. 10, 2008); Agreed Final Judgment at 1, Texas v. Select
Medical Corp., No. 08-01-21154 (286th Dist. Ct., Hockley County, Tex. July 16, 2008).
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reasonable procedures to protect and safeguard personal identifying in-
formation from unlawful use or disclosure, and (3) failed to destroy or
arrange for the destruction of personal identifying information within its
control that it did not retain control over. 122
Abbott requested injunctive relief to prevent Select Medical and CVS
from committing future acts in violation of the laws, or, alternatively, in-
junctive relief requiring the companies to contract with a business that
provides document disposal services in compliance with the laws. 123 Ab-
bott also requested that the courts fine the companies $500 in civil penal-
ties per document that was improperly discarded under section 35.48 of
the Business and Commerce Code and $2,000 to $50,000 for each viola-
tion under section 48.201 of the code. 124 Ultimately, the Liberty County
District Court ordered CVS to pay the state $315,000 in penalties 125 and
the Hockley County District Court ordered Select Medical to pay
$990,000 in penalties. 126 The courts also enjoined the health care compa-
nies from future acts in violation of the laws and required the companies
to implement a detailed compliance program to ensure proper disposal of
sensitive patient information in the future. 127
In the judgments, the courts provided almost identical, lengthy require-
ments for the health care companies' medical record disposal compliance
programs, 128 and these judgments offer a wealth of information to Texas
health care companies. The medical record disposal compliance pro-
grams from the judgments include requirements such as: written docu-
mentation of the compliance program, designation of a committed
compliance officer, procedures for initially assessing and periodically
evaluating the company's compliance risks, policies governing employee
retention and evaluation related to program compliance, procedures for
monitoring program implementation and effectiveness, and employee
training on the compliance program, relevant laws, and how to report
program violations. 12 9 To minimize the risk of similar claims and large
fines, health care companies with Texas locations might consider re-eval-
uating their document disposal compliance programs in light of the mini-
mum program requirements outlined in the CVS and Select Medical
judgments.
122. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 4, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 6-7, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
123. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 4, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 7, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
124. Plaintiff's Original Petition at 5, CVS, No. CV-72881; Plaintiff's Original Petition
at 8, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
125. Agreed Final Judgment at 7, CVS, No. CV-72881.
126. Agreed Final Judgment at 11, Select Medical, No. 08-01-21154.
127. Id. at 4-10; Agreed Final Judgment at 3-7, CVS, No. CV-72881.




V. PUBLIC HEALTH AND INDIGENT CARE
Public health and indigent care issues were hot topics this year. The
Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas Health and Human Services
Commission's (HHSC) data-collection method for determining state
Medicaid payment rates to hospitals was an invalidly promulgated rule
under the Texas Administrative Procedures Act (APA). In addition, the
Texas attorney general ruled that a county government could not pay cer-
tain health care claims submitted by health care providers because the
claims resulted in unconstitutional local government debt. In another
opinion, the attorney general concluded that implementation of Bexar
County's recently enacted pilot needle-exchange program would likely vi-
olate Texas controlled substances laws that prohibit the possession or de-
livery of drug paraphernalia.
A. THE AUTHORITY OF INFORMAL MEDICAID
REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES
In El Paso Hospital District v. Texas Health and Human Services Com-
mission, the hospital sought a declaratory judgment that the HHSC's
data-collection method for determining Medicaid payment rates to hospi-
tals was an invalid rule under the APA. 130 HHSC sets Medicaid payment
rates using a prospective payment system that bases future payment rates
on average costs and claims data from prior years.13 1 Medicaid statutes
and regulations require HHSC to use claims and cost data from twelve-
month periods that run concurrently with the state government's fiscal
year.' 32 However, HHSC had an internal policy of limiting the annual
claims data to those claims that had been paid within six months of the
end of the twelve-month period. 133
The hospital argued that this policy inappropriately reduced the pay-
ment rate by excluding more costly claims from the twelve-month period
because these more costly claims often took longer for HHSC to adjudi-
cate and pay.13 4 The hospital also argued that this policy was invalid be-
cause it was not promulgated as an HHSC rule and open to public
comment as required by the APA.135 In response, HHSC argued that its
policy was not a rule subject to the APA because it was merely an inter-
pretation of a rule.136 The court agreed with the hospital and held the
policy to be an invalid rule under the APA. 137 The court explained that
the policy fit squarely within the definition of a rule under the APA be-
130. El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 709,
711 (Tex. 2008). The Texas Administrative Procedure Act is codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. §§ 2001.001-.902 (Vernon 2008).
131. Id. at 712.
132. Id. at 713.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 713, 715.
135. Id. at 713-14.




cause it was an agency statement that: (1) affected the interest of the
public at large, (2) implemented law or policy or amended or repealed a
prior rule, and (3) affected a private right or procedure rather than only
the internal management or organization of a state agency.138 According
to the court, the policy affected the public at large because the prospec-
tive payment system and its calculations affect all hospitals receiving re-
imbursement for inpatient Medicaid services. 139 Further, the policy
effectively amended the prior rule defining how HHSC would calculate
Medicaid payment rates by essentially limiting the claims data that HHSC
would use from the required twelve-month period. 140 Finally, the policy
affected the hospital's private rights, rather than only the internal man-
agement of HHSC, because the claims-limiting policy directly affected
the prospective payment-rate formula and the hospital's right to
reimbursement. 141
The supreme court's ruling in favor of the hospital in El Paso Hospital
District gives Texas health care providers more certainty regarding the
authority of novel Medicaid claims and reimbursement requirements
from various guidance documents and manuals published by HHSC and
Medicaid contractors, such as TMHP (Texas Medicaid Healthcare Part-
nership). Usually, these manuals and resource documents simply reiter-
ate or rephrase Medicaid statutes or regulations. However, these
resources sometimes contain new hurdles or limitations that are not oth-
erwise present in any statutes or regulations. El Paso Hospital District
provides health care providers with a new tool for disputing the validity
of these informal sources of Medicaid rules and requirements in the event
that a requirement infringes on a provider's right to Medicaid
reimbursement.
B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEBT FOR INDIGENT CARE
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott recently issued an opinion con-
cluding that the Cameron County Commissioners Court could not direct
the county to pay certain indigent health care claims because the claims
were likely unconstitutional debt. 142 Cameron County allocates a certain
percentage of the current year's tax revenues to the payment of indigent
health care services through contracts with health care providers. 143 In
the event that the claims exceed the allocated budget for the year, the
county pays the claims from the general tax revenues of the following
year.' 44 Under the Texas Constitution, city and county governments are
prohibited from incurring any debt without levying a tax to pay the inter-
138. Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(6)(A)-(C)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 714-15.
142. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0652 (2008).
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id. at 5.
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est on the obligation and two percent of the principal. 145 Abbott con-
cluded that the payment of the excess claims from future tax revenues
was a county debt and that such debt was unconstitutional because it was
incurred without the required additional tax to pay the interest and prin-
cipal portion. 146 Thus, Abbott stated that the Cameron County Commis-
sioners Court could not order the county to pay these claims because they
were not "just and legal demands" under the Texas Constitution.1 47 Ab-
bott also stated that he was not asked to write and was not offering an
opinion on any legal remedies the health care providers may have on the
outstanding claims. 148
Abbott's opinion is interesting in light of the current climate of local
government budget shortfalls, the growing uninsured population, and the
steady rise in health care costs. It is unclear how the Cameron County
health care providers will address this specific payment refusal, but, going
forward, health care providers may need to be more attentive to the reve-
nue sources and allocated budgets of Texas local and county governments
when contracting for health care services payment.
C. CLEAN NEEDLES PILOT PROGRAM COULD VIOLATE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS
In another attorney general opinion, Abbott concluded that the re-
cently enacted Bexar County pilot needle exchange program (the Pilot
Program) 149 could result in violations of the Texas controlled substances
law,150 which prohibits the possession or delivery of drug paraphernalia.
The opinion requestor, Senator Jeff Wentworth, argued that the Pilot
Program statute implicitly exempted program participants from prosecu-
tion under the controlled substances law because: (1) that was the legisla-
ture's intent, and (2) the legislature clearly did not intend to create a
program that was effectively illegal.1 51 Abbott disagreed with Senator
Wentworth's arguments. The attorney general's opinion began by ex-
plaining that the statute permitted, but did not require, Bexar County to
implement the Pilot Program. 152 Thus, on its face, the Pilot Program stat-
ute was not inconsistent with the controlled substances law prohibiting
the possession or delivery of drug paraphernalia.1 53 Abbott further ex-
plained that it must be assumed that the legislature was aware of the law
prohibiting the possession of drug paraphernalia but chose not to include
an express provision exempting the Pilot Program from the law.154
145. Id. at 2-3 (referencing TEX. CONST. art XI, § 7).
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 6-7.
148. Id. at 7 n.6.
149. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 531.0972 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
150. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
151. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0622 at 3 (2008).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 5.
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In support of this argument, Abbott discussed numerous, express statu-
tory exceptions to the controlled substances laws that the legislature had
chosen to include in similar public health program statutes in the past.155
To summarize, Abbott stated, "we must take the statutes as we find them
and allow the Legislature, if it wishes, to remedy any alleged defects. 1 56
Abbott took his argument a step further by providing an itemized list of
numerous other state and federal laws that the Pilot Program could impli-
cate if implemented by Bexar County under the current version of the
statute. 157 Abbott also commented that it would be an issue of
prosecutorial discretion on whether or not Pilot Program participants
would be prosecuted under any laws. 158
Of note, Texas legislators have already filed three bills in the 81st Leg-
islative Session that would exempt state disease control program activi-
ties, such as the needle exchange activities of the Pilot Program, from the
drug paraphernalia law at section 481.125 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code.159 It will be interesting to see if the legislature decides to pass any
of these laws in response to the attorney general's opinion on the legality
of the needle exchange program.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, this Survey period has given attorneys a wide range of new
legal issues and developments to consider when advising Texas health
care clients. In addition to the opinions selected for discussion in this
article, Texas health care attorneys might also be interested in the follow-
ing cases decided during the survey period that are worth noting: Texas ex
rel Ven-A-Care v. Abbott Laboratories Inc., which resulted in multimil-
lion-dollar settlements with the pharmaceutical manufacturers Abbott
Laboratories and GlaxoSmithKline over allegations that they inflated
Medicaid price reports and overcharged the Texas Medicaid program, 60
Boren v. Texoma Medical Center, holding that a hospital did not have a
duty to warn third parties that a patient might harm his family after the
155. Id. (referring to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.111(c) (Vernon Supp.
2008) ("Similarly, the Legislature has expressly excepted from specified provisions of the
Texas Controlled Substances Act a person who 'possesses or delivers ... drug parapherna-
lia to be used to introduce tetrahydrocannabinols or their derivatives into the human body,
for use in a federally approved therapeutic research program."').
156. id.
157. Id. at 7 Examples provided included state felony conspiracy under TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 2008), state felony dispensing of drug paraphernalia to
a minor under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125(c) (Vernon Supp. 2008),
federal criminal drug paraphernalia possession under 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) (2000), and fed-
eral criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) Id.
158. Id. at 6-7.
159. Tex. H.B. 272, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2 (2009); Tex. H.B. 142, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2
(2009); Tex. S.B. 188, 81st Leg., R.S., at § 2 (2009).
160. Settlement Agreement and Release with Abbott Labs., Texas v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., No. D-1-GV-04-01286 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sep. 8, 2008); Settlement
Agreement and Release with GlaxoSmithKline, Texas v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. D-1-GV-
04-01286 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Oct. 11, 2007).
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hospital refused to admit the patient with self-inflicted wounds and sui-
cidal ideations,'161 and Merck & Co. v. Garza, which partially reversed
and remanded a multimillion-dollar products liability verdict against
Merck alleging that one of its drugs, Vioxx, caused the death of a patient
suffering from a heart condition. 162
161. 258 S.W.3d 224, 225-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
162. 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. filed) (the original opinion
issued on May 14, 2008 was withdrawn and superseded with a Dec. 10, 2008 opinion based
on a rehearing regarding jury misconduct).
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